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In this article1, I investigate a special type of argument regarding the role of development
in theorizing about psychological processes and cognitive capacities. Among the
issues that developmental psychologists study, discovering the ontogenetic trajectory
of mechanisms or capacities underpinning our cognitive functions ranks highly. The
order in which functions are developed or capacities are acquired is a matter of debate
between competing psychological theories, and also philosophical conceptions of the
mind – getting the role and the significance of the different steps in this order right
could be seen as an important virtue of such theories. Thus, a special kind of strategy
in arguments between competing philosophical or psychological theories is using
developmental order in arguing for or against a given psychological claim. In this article,
I will introduce an analysis of arguments from developmental order, which come in two
general types: arguments emphasizing the importance of the early cognitive processes
and arguments emphasizing the late cognitive processes. I will discuss their role in one
of the central tools for evaluating scientific theories, namely in making inferences to
the best explanation. I will argue that appeal to developmental order is, by itself, an
insufficient criterion for theory choice and has to be part of an argument based on other
core explanatory or empirical virtues. I will end by proposing a more concerted study of
philosophical issues concerning (cognitive) development, and I will present some topics
that also pertain to a full-fledged ‘philosophy of development.’
Keywords: development, developmental order, inference to the best explanation, philosophy of science,
argumentation, conditional reasoning, theories of concepts, developmental psychology
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental topic in the philosophy of psychology is the role of development in theorizing
about psychological processes and cognitive capacities. Developmental psychologists track the
trajectories of cognition on several levels and for a wide variety of cognitive functions. They
establish an order in which functions are developed or capacities are acquired. When comparing
alternative theories of the mind, the significance of the different steps in this order can be debated.
A special kind of strategy in arguments between competing philosophical or psychological
theories is using developmental order in arguing for or against a given psychological claim. In
this article, I will introduce an analysis of arguments from developmental order and I will discuss
their role in making inferences to the best explanation. I will argue that appeal to developmental
order is, by itself, an insufficient criterion for theory choice and has to be part of an argument based
on other core explanatory or empirical virtues.
1An earlier version of this paper was published as a blog post on the iCog blog (see Stöckle-Schobel, 2015).
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DEVELOPMENTAL ORDER
I want to begin by considering what is at stake when talking
about the developmental order of mental processes. There are
developmental trajectories for a large number of mental processes
M. We can observe that the functioning of M changes over
the human lifespan. Suppose that there is empirical evidence
that children use process P1 for a mental process M. During
cognitive development, further processes P2, P3, and P4 start
to replace or to support P1. In adulthood, the set of mental
capacities used for M might contain P3 and P4, or evolved
forms of P1 and P4, just P4, or a different combination of
processes. As a simplified example of a trajectory and processes,
consider number cognition. The trajectory from a very limited
understanding of quantities in infancy to the ability to use
rational numbers in adolescence is explained by appeal to three
sets of cognitive abilities, according to Carey (2009): first, there
are mechanisms for differentiating small quantities, and for
roughly computing large differences between sets of things. Next,
with learning the number words, the ability to count and to
use natural numbers develops. Third, with learning even more
mathematical theory, we gain the ability to use division and to
thus use rational numbers.
Even while agreeing with Thelen and Smith (1994) that
development is not a single, linear process and that setbacks
and various different ‘architectures’ can lead to a fully developed
cognitive system, I think it is fair to assume that, for any given
cognitive process, there are several theories with at least some
empirical support at several points in ontogeny. Some of these are
bound to be in conflict about the proper interpretation of the data
and about the correct analysis of the developmental trajectory.
In the cognitive sciences of development, we can thus
ask: Which mechanism or which process (e.g., P1, P2,. . .) is
fundamental for M in human cognition? We can use conceptual
thinking as an example for M; which type of concepts, or which
conceptual structure do we find in human development? There
are several theoretical frameworks for the study of concepts. The
most widely discussed ones are Prototype Theory (PT; Rosch and
Mervis, 1975; Rosch, 1978), Exemplar Theory (ET; Medin and
Smith, 1981; Nosofsky, 2014), Theory Theory (TT; Keil, 1989;
Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1998), and Neo-Empiricist Theories (NET;
Prinz, 2002). They all differ in their definition of what concepts
are, and in their explanation of how concepts play the role of
constituents of thought, broadly construed. As such, each of them
is bound to tell a different developmental story, with its own order
of processes P1PT , . . . PiPT , etc.
This wide range of alternative frameworks has led some
researchers to consider the possibility of a pluralism of types of
concepts (Gelman, 2004; Weiskopf, 2009; Rice, 2016). Machery
(2009) uses these pluralist considerations to argue for the
elimination of concept as a term of theoretical significance in the
cognitive sciences. For present purposes, I want to consider how
the potential plurality of types of concepts might be debated in
developmental terms. After all, if there were a good argument
from developmental order, showing that one type of concept
indeed is developmentally more fundamental than the others, one
would have a reason to doubt Machery’s eliminativist argument.
PRIORITY OF THE EARLY PROCESS:
DEV_EARLY
The first argumentative strategy when discussing a given
developmental order of psychological processes is what I call
the Dev_Early view. One of its instantiations is to hold that the
developmentally early process P1 is the best model for M; other
construals are in principle consistent with the view, e.g., that P1
and P2 give the preferable explanation (either in conjunction,
or as alternatives that the cognitive system weighs contextually).
A theory of M should thus focus on the first processes for M
in their models. The initial processes, the argument goes, is not
replaced by later developments; rather, more elaborate versions
of P1 play its role in adults, or P1 by itself would be sufficient for
performing P4’s role in adult cognition. Without P1 as the starting
point, M might have developed in a radically different way, or it
would not have been possible to achieve this mental capacity.
Using the example of concepts, one possible position to
hold is the following: When looking at the developmental data
available, one type of concept emerges as the best explanation
of infant performance. For example, Yermolayeva and Rakison
(2009) cite evidence from face recognition studies that infants
first use exemplars, and only later begin using frequency
information (prototypes) and, even later, causal principles and
rules (theories).2 If the experiments only revealed a reliance
on other processes later in development, one might argue that
they cannot be fundamental for conceptual thinking. Thus, the
developmental order of acquisition might be used as a reason to
argue for a theoretical position.
PRIORITY OF THE LATE PROCESS:
DEV_LATE
However, one can also adopt the Dev_Late position when
arguing about developmental orders. This would take the form
of arguing that explaining M is best achieved by appeal to the
developmentally late process P4, or again to a combination of
late processes P3 and P4, as above. Since it is the mature form
of the process, P4 is the best foundation for a theory of M.
Among its advantages, one might find its better integration with
other mental processes. For example, if P1 were a simple form
of associative thought, and P4 were a sophisticated reasoning
heuristic, the latter process’s integration with background
knowledge and broad applicability would speak for privileging
it. Also, one could make a normative argument for P4. If done
right, M works by P4, i.e., it is the best tool for solving the given
cognitive problem, or for performing the given task. Thus, one
should base one’s theory on the assumption that the late process
is fundamental or central.
Using the example of concepts again, one line of argument
might be that there is a higher cognitive power in having a
2Note that Murphy (2002) interprets the infant research to show a slight preference
for prototypes instead of exemplars, but for present expository purposes, I regard
Yermolayeva and Rakison (2009)’s position more as proof-of-concept rather than
as an established possibility.
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diverse range of kinds of concept available and that there is no
explanatory gain in regarding any one of them as primary. Hybrid
Theorists such as Rice (2016) argue for a multitude of types of
concepts that rely on different kinds of information, but which
are able to fulfill similar cognitive roles. Just because one type is
ontogenetically prior, one should not privilege it above the other
types; developmental superiority trumps priority, as it were.
A SECOND EXAMPLE: CONDITIONAL
REASONING
Similar forms of argumentation surface in other areas of research.
Consider the development of conditional reasoning as another
example. Again, there are several theories that attempt to explain
the way humans reason with conditionals. The three most
notable groups of theories are Mental Models accounts (Johnson-
Laird and Byrne, 2002; Thompson and Byrne, 2002; Byrne
and Johnson-Laird, 2009; Johnson-Laird, 2010), Suppositional
accounts (Edgington, 1995; Bennett, 2003; Evans and Over,
2004; Oaksford and Chater, 2007), and Mental Logic accounts
(Rips, 1994; Braine and O’Brien, 1998). In several recent studies,
Gauffroy and Barrouillet (2014), and Barrouillet and Gauffroy
(2015) have proposed a developmental trajectory for conditional
reasoning. They advocate a modified Mental Models account as
fundamental for understanding conditionals (cf. Barrouillet and
Gauffroy, 2015, p. 34). Barrouillet and Gauffroy (2015) propose
that the interpretation of conditionals, specifically probabilistic
conditionals, evolves from an initial incomplete mental model
(which treats a conditional as equivalent to a conjunction) to a
more fleshed-out mental model that corresponds to a defective
biconditional interpretation to a model that corresponds with the
Suppositional Theory’s strategy for evaluating conditionals (i.e.,
some variant of applying the Ramsey Test, cf. Edgington, 1995;
Willer, 2010). Assuming that these results are robust, one can
once again use an argument from developmental order in either
direction:
Dev_Early – Cond: Interpreting the late developmental
achievements as extensions of the developmental early capacity.
Thereby, one would focus on the developmental stability –
some adult participants in their experiments still use the
‘conjunctive’ conditional rather than the ‘suppositional’
conditional – and on the continuities in reasoning – one would be
able to justify a re-interpretation of the ‘suppositional’ responses
as more refined mental-model-responses (cf. Barrouillet and
Gauffroy, 2015, p. 34). The late developmental achievements
found in adult reasoners are taken to speak against the
Suppositional account, as that explanation is supposedly
incompatible with the earlier developmental data (the reliance
on a conjunctive understanding of the conditional).
Dev_Late – Cond: Appealing to the supposed normative
correctness of the theory that best corresponds to the late
developmental achievements, and diminishing the role of earlier
developmental capacities by highlighting the disadvantages of the
theories that champion them as the best normative theories.
A typical explanation of the ‘normatively incorrect’
performance in younger ages would be to appeal to factors that
inhibit the employment of the ‘normatively correct’ strategy –
in analogy with examples like the inhibitors (weight gain in the
legs) that prevent infants from making stepping motions after
2 months of age (cf. Thelen and Smith, 1994, p. 11f.), or by
appeal to the performance-competence distinction (cf. Chomsky,
1965; Le Corre et al., 2006). Furthermore, potential proponents
of the Dev_Late – Cond view – proponents of the Suppositional
Theory – could point to the high numbers of responses that
uniquely fit with their predictions, both in their own studies
(cf. Over et al., 2007) and in Gauffroy and Barrouillet’s (2014)
experiments.
With these descriptions and examples in mind, I would like to
turn to the question of the explanatory status of arguments from
developmental order.
EXPLANATORY CONSIDERATIONS
Prima facie, both kinds of argument have virtues that we
look for in psychological explanations. After all, they rely on
a potentially wide range of empirical evidence and they are
attempts at providing a bigger-picture view of a research topic.
I want to consider whether appeals to the early or late temporal
position of a cognitive process relates to special (or especially
important) virtues of a theory. When adjudicating between
different theories, would an Inference to the Best Explanation
(IBE) categorically favor Late_Dev over Early_Dev, or the other
way around?
Inference to the Best Explanation is a method for evaluating
scientific theories. When considering a body of empirical data
and several rival theories that attempt to make sense of the
data, we should choose the theory that gives the best explanation
of the observations, assuming that the theory itself conforms
to some standards of adequacy (cf. Lipton, 2004). In general,
Lipton proposes that the aim of a theory should be to give a
lovely explanation – an explanation which has many of theoretical
virtues is supposed to be a good explanation. Lovely explanations,
in turn, are more likely to be conducive to truth. So, the loveliest
explanations are supposed to be coextensive with the likeliest
explanations (cf. Lipton, 2004, p. 61).
The typical virtues that IBEs rely on are theoretical virtues
such as “scope, precision, mechanism, unification (. . .) [or]
simplicity” (Lipton, 2000, p. 187), but there are also empirical
virtues to be considered, such as fit of a theory with empirical
data or superior ability to make empirical predictions (cf. Van
Fraassen, 1977; Ruhmkorff, 2005).
Inferences to the best explanation, however, are not a miracle
cure in disputes between competing theories. As Sprevak (2010)
points out, arguing for or against a theory by appeal to an IBE
is difficult at best and unjustified at worst, since “IBE is highly
sensitive to the competitive context” (Sprevak, 2010, p. 354).
Based on a comparison with these main types of virtues
on which IBEs are typically based, I want to argue that
developmental order is not a decisive criterion for favoring one
theory over another; both argumentative strategies can only
succeed in combination with an appeal to other theoretical or
empirical virtues. The argument for this position is as follows.
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A given theory A that can adequately explain a large part
of the empirical results from developmental research and uses
this for a Dev_Early argument is ceteris paribus better than
an alternative theory B which has all of A’s virtues except the
fit with developmental data (with or without an argument by
developmental order). However, a comparison between theory
A and a rival theory C, which is equally theoretically virtuous
and developmentally informed, but gives a Dev_Late argument
supporting its differing hypotheses, is a much less clear-cut affair.
Just because a mental process P1 is used early in development, it
isn’t necessarily a good candidate as the model for how we should
explain human cognition with regard to P1’s functional domain.
It only becomes a good candidate if we find additional reasons to
regard it as such, such as continuity throughout the lifespan, or
evolutionary continuity with other species (if for example great
apes also used P1). Equally, a given mental process P4 is not
superior just because it is the last addition to the ‘mental toolbox’
for solving a cognitive problem. Rather, it becomes the superior
candidate by, for instance, being the most reliable mechanism for
solving the problem, or by being the most flexible mechanism.
Our choice of proposed mechanism to solve cognitive problems
should thus depend on the kind of theory we want to advocate
and its fit with the available data, in conjunction with the ability
to generate good predictions.
To illustrate this, consider the example from the conditional
reasoning literature. If my position holds, neither the Mental
Models theorist nor the Suppositional theorist can cash in
on their Dev_Early/Late argument by itself. The success of
their arguments rather depends on whether one finds that the
developmental continuity of conditional reasoning capacities is
a bigger virtue than the better compatibility with adult reasoning
results, or vice versa. Depending on such choices of priorities in
theoretical virtues, and further depending on an analysis of the
explanatory virtues of the competing theories, one can then go
on and endorse the theory that indeed gives the best explanation.
Furthermore, deliberation about theory choice should not
ultimately be decided by appeal to developmental order, but
rather by a broad consideration of the fit between theoretical
explanations and empirical evidence. Before we can endorse a
Dev_Early or a Dev_Late argument, we need to think through
deeper philosophical issues, such as the ones I raised above
as justifications for taking either stance; for example, without
an account of what we take the normative aim of a given
mental process to be, without an understanding of the role of
the earliest cognitive capacities (and indeed, without a stance
on innateness and on cognitive change), or indeed without an
account of the evolutionary role of a cognitive function (among,
of course, several other issues), we risk telling ‘just-so stories’
when appealing to developmental order.
I would like to emphasize that this is not meant to diminish
the role of experimental studies of the developmental trajectories
of our cognitive processes. Developmental psychology has made
tremendous progress in terms of methodology and breadth of
investigation in the last decades, and we can only expect to gain a
deeper understanding of human psychology by continuing our
present efforts. However, I want to urge caution and care in
theorizing about these empirical results.
OUTLOOK: A PHILOSOPHY OF
DEVELOPMENT?
I would like to finish this short investigation by linking it
to a broader philosophical project of thinking about cognitive
development. Admittedly, developmental research has grappled
with questions related to the issues identified above for quite
some time. To wit, the issue of (dis)continuity in conceptual
change covers a similar ground – are our concepts continuous
throughout the lifespan, or are there radical changes in
our conceptual abilities that make earlier and later concepts
incommensurable (cf. Keil, 1981; Carey, 2009)?
Another related issue concerns the study of developmental
trajectories more generally. As Adolph et al. (2008) observe,
the shape of such trajectories crucially depends on the choice
of measuring intervals. To get a clearer understanding of the
onset time of a newly developing capacity, often a fine grain of
measurement is necessary.
A further investigation of questions about development will
need to connect the issues raised in this paper to issues in
ethology, most notably to Tinbergen’s four questions (Tinbergen,
1963) and to questions regarding the relations between phylogeny
and ontogeny on several theoretical levels (Stamps, 2003; Bateson
and Laland, 2013).
In line with the above considerations from the philosophy
of science, I would like to offer the present paper as a call for
more work on the philosophical questions regarding cognitive
development. At the intersection of psychology, philosophy of
science, and philosophy of mind, there are many open questions
that should be addressed by a ‘philosophy of development.’
Thinking about the limitations of arguing for a theory by
appeal to development is only one of many possible starting
points.
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